[ANP16] Zaruhi Aslanyan, Flemming Nielson and David Parker. Quantitative Verification and Synthesis of Attack-Defence Scenarios. In Proc. 29th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'16), pages 105-119, IEEE. June 2016. [pdf] [bib] [Proposes formal verification techniques for attack-defence scenarios based on model checking of stochastic games and building on the PRISM-games tool.]
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Notes: Supporting files for this paper can be found at https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/files/csf16adt/ (the link cited in the paper no longer works).
Abstract. Attack-defence trees are a powerful technique for formally evaluating attack-defence scenarios. They represent in an intuitive, graphical way the interaction between an attacker and a defender who compete in order to achieve conflicting objectives. We propose a novel framework for the formal analysis of quantitative properties of complex attack-defence scenarios, using an extension of attack-defence trees which models temporal ordering of actions and allows explicit dependencies in the strategies adopted by attackers and defenders. We adopt a game-theoretic approach, translating attack-defence trees to two-player stochastic games, and then employ probabilistic model checking techniques to formally analyse these models. This provides a means to both verify formally specified security properties of the attack-defence scenarios and, dually, to synthesise strategies for attackers or defenders which guarantee or optimise some quantitative property, such as the probability of a successful attack or the incurred cost, or some multi-objective trade-off between the two. We implement our approach, building upon the PRISM-games model checker, and apply it to a case study of an RFID goods management system.